As we know the Egyptians who occupied in 1884 all the coast of the Red Sea down to Ras Hafun in the Indian Ocean were forced to withdraw from these areas because of the collapse of the Egyptian authority in the Sudan. Consequently, Britain replaced Egypt. In the area by denying Turkish claim of sovereignty in the region. Aniis Abdillahi Essa
TREATIES BETWEEN BRITAIN AND SOMALILANDERS IN 1884-1885
We the undersigned elders of Isaak Clan, are desirous of entering into an agreement with the British Government for the maintenance of our independence, the preservation of order and other good and sufficient reasons.
Now it is hereby agreed and covenanted as follow:
ARTICLE 1:
We do hereby declare that they are pledged an bound never to cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British Government, any portion of the territory presently inhabited by them or being under their control. .
ARTICLE II:
All vessels under the British flag shall have free permission to trade at all ports and places within the territories of the clan and neighbor.
ARTICLE III:
All British subjects, residing in or visiting the territories of our land shall enjoy perfect safety protection and shall be entitled to travel all over the said limits under the sage conduct of the elders of the Isaaks.
ARTICLE IV:
The traffic in slaves throughout the territories of the clan shall cease for ever, and the commander of any her Majesty’s vessels, or any other British officer duly authorized, shall have the power of requiring the surrender of any slave and of supporting the demand by force of arms by land and sea.
ARTICLE V:
The British Government shall have the power to appoint and agent or agents to reside in the territories of the clan and every such agent shall be treated with respect and consideration and be entitled to have for his or her protection such guard as the British Government deem sufficient.
The above written treaty shall come into force and have effect from the date of signing this agreement.
In token of the conclusion of this lawful and honorable bond ( names of elders inserted here)
(Name of Assistant and political resident inserted here together with witnesses) and the latter behalf of the British Government to each and all in the presence of witnesses affix their signature, marks or seals at place inserted here) on 1885.
SUPPLEMENTARY GENERAL TREATY BETWEEN ISSAAKS AND BRITISH,1886:
The British Government and the elders of Isaaks who have signed this agreement being desirous of maintaining and strengthening the relations of peace and friendship existing between them:
The British Government have and appointed Major Frederick Meycer Hunter, C.S.I., political agent for the Somaliland Coast, to conclude a treaty for this purpose.
The said Major Frederick Meycer Hunter and the said elders of Somalilander have agreed upon and concluded the following articles:
ARTICLE I:
The British Government, in compliance with the wish of the undersigned elders of Somalilander hereby undertake to extend to them and to the territories under their authority and jurisdiction the gracious favor and protection of her Majesty the Queen.
ARTICLE II:
The said elders of Somlilander agree and promise to refrain from entering into any correspondence agreement or treaty with any foreign nation or power except with the knowledge and sanction of her Majesty’s Government.
ARTICLE III:
This treaty shall come into operation upon the first day of February one, thousand eight hundred and eighty six. ( elders of Somalilander inserted here and Signed F.H. Hunter, Major), political agent, Somaliland coast.
Let me go back to my question why somaliland broke away ?
With no flowing rivers, with no great tropical forests to entice the rain, the way of life for the great majority of the three million or so somalis who live in the self-declared Somaliland Republic is nomadic pastoralism: The breeding of camels, sheep and goats in an intricate pattern of calculated movements across vast stretches of savanna.
South of the border with Ethiopia, The Somaliland plateaus slopes gently towards the generally better pastures of the Haud, a territory which is occupied during the rainy seasons by Somali nomads and their livestock from Somaliland , through under the sovereignty and administration of the Ethiopian Government. It is precious land and the cause of deep emotional travail which led in 1960 to the merger of Somaliland and Somalia, on a ticket of Great Somalia.
The turning points in their history, apart from the momentous British surrender of their lands, were a few positive features of post-war colonial rule: the quality of education, for example, and that of the civil service and the judiciary. Add to these the freedom to trade and to invest, since Somaliland was a protectorate, never really a colony to be settled---there were seldom more than a few dozen British colonials there, all of whom were part of the official administration. These experiences were part of Somaliland’s cultural baggage with which they traveled to Mogadishu after gaining their independence from British on 26 June 1960. It was another turning point in their history –a political and cultural shock.
Somaliland’s Prime Minister, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Eagal was kept in the dark about the plots which were underway in Mogadishu to fill the key posts of prime minister and minister of interior.
These had been leaked to the British Embassy before Egal was aware of them. It was not a good beginning. And when the northern and southern legislatures met, each with an independent text of an "Act of Union" for a unity state, no act of union was signed and the matter was deferred for a year for decision by referendum.
When the referendum was held in June 1961 to approve the constitution, the principal political party in the north, The Somali National League (SNL), decided to boycott it, and of the 100,000 recorded voters, over 60% opposed the constitution, 72% in Hargeisa, 69% in Burao, 68% in Berbera, 69 % in Erigavo. As a vote of confidence in unity with the south, the north gave its verdict. Six months later, Sand Hurst-trained junior officers, serving under Italian-trained senior officers, staged a coup d’etat which failed. The purpose was to restore Somaliland’s sovereignty.
On 6 April 1981, the Isaaks formed the Somali National Movement
(SNM) in London to overthrow Barre and his regime. A year later Somali students in hargeisa demonstrated in large numbers in protest against the arbitrary detention of 37 professionals who were carrying out voluntary work to improve the standard of the central Hospital of hargeisa which had been neglected by the authorities. The professionals, according to Mohamed Baruud Ali in the Somali conflict and the Undercurrent Causes, were behind an underground newsletter, called UFO, meaning "whirlwind". The students were mown down for their pains by tanks and armored personnel carriers, with high mortality. The day, 24 February 1982, was a turning point in the Somali Lander’s calendar of struggle against Barre " Afweyne".The massacre brought the
SNM hotfoot to Addis Ababa where they were welcomed by Mengistu’s Government, despite some problems the Ethiopians were having with the SSDF, which was opposed to having a competitor seek Ethiopian weapons and ammunition, and ,by extension, help from Libya and PDRYemen. The PDRYemen did in fact arm the first 500 SNM militia. They established their primary base in Jigjiga, building up their guerrilla forces in the Haud from where they launched forays against Barre’s 26th and 27th military garrisons in the Northwestern region, including a daring raid on the Mandera central prison in 1983, where they released the over one thousand prisoners, including political detainees and other inmates.At the
SNM’s fourth congress in 1984, Ahmed Mohamed Mahamoud "Siilaanyo", took over the leadership of the SNM as chairman. His vice-chairman was a Hawiye from Mogadisho, Ali Mohamed Ossoble "Wardhiigly", but by 1987 Barre had managed to drive a wedge between the Isaaq and the Hawiye, and Ali wardhiigly returned to Mogadisho. A year later, in April 1988, there was a political setback. Mengistu was under severe pressure from the Eritrea (EPRDF), Ogaden (WSLF) and Oromo (OLF) liberation movements and decided to abandon the SSDF and the SNM to their fate and establish an accord with Barre. In a desperate response, the SNM marshaled their militias in the Haud and planned an assault on Barre’s garrisons stationed in Hargeisa and Burao. Their attacks were launched on May 27 and May 30 in 1988 with determined ferocity against Barre’s better equipped regular army. The garrisons were overrun. In the general euphoria that followed these unexpected victories, little did the victors imagine the consequences. The two cities, Hargeisa, and Burao, were decimated by murderous artillery fire and, in Hargeisa’s case, from the air by fighter planes, including Hunters flown by hired South African pilots. The bombing was carried out on the orders of Vice-President General Somater " Who is today in Fairfax, VA, in the United States of America" and approved, of course by President Barre "Afweyne" in an exercise of punitive retribution. Between 40,000 to 50,000 Somali Lander mostly "Isaaqs" were estimated to have been killed in both cities. The civil war had begun in earnest.Two and a half years later, at the end of January 1991, as the Mogadishu USC armed followers from within the city and Aideed’s militia from without, converged on Villa Somalia, causing a desperate President to flee for his life, the
SNM engaged Barre’s garrisons in the North as they retreated to Berbera. Several officers escaped by sea. The SNM recaptured Berbera on January 29, Hargeisa and Burao on January 31, Borama on Febraury 4, and Erigaveo on the next day. All prisoners, including Dhulbahante and Gadabirsi soldiers serving with Barre’s forces, were released and ordered to return to their regions and , in the case of the Ogaden and the Oromo, to Ethiopia. But a large number of hawiye solders remained in Burao because their lives would have been at risk if they had traveled through hostile Darood country on their return to Mogadisho.In contrast to the revengeful political style adopted in Mogadisho on Barre’s downfall, the
SNM carried out no acts of political retribution. This, despite the extensive destruction to property carried out by the garrison in Hargeisa, Burao and in other urban areas, and the deliberate removal of roofing material, doors, windows, water pipes and fittings, cooper wire furniture and equipment, pumps and installations, all of which were sold in the markets of neighboring countries and the United Arab Emirate.For the
SNM, now chaired by Abdirahman Ahmed Ali " Tuur" since April 1990, to have taken or encouraged vengeance would have resulted in internecine warfare, as happened in the south. Instead, the SNM relied on a traditional approach, invoking the skills of the clan elders to bring about a state of political equilibrium. Four delegations representing the non-Isaaq sub-clans, namely, the Dhulbahante,Issa,Warsangali, and Gadabiirsi met the SNM in Berbera from February 15-27. The question was whether the conciliatory policies of the SNM would heal the rifts among the people of these regions, some of whom were not wholly averse to the Barre regime from which they had indirectly profited, and bring them into harmony with the SNM. It was a successful prelude to a more formal regional conference planned to coincide with the Congress of the 99-member SNM Central Committee, to be held in May. The Congress was held from early May until June 4 in Burao. The two highlights of this intensive debate, which ranged from politics and security to revenue and expenditure, were the declaration of Somaliland’s sovereignty and the debate leading to the choice of a constitutional system. TheSNM executive had not wished to go so far as to sever the political jugular with the rest of Somalia because it was felt that the country’s economy was not in a robust enough condition to withstand international diplomatic rejection. On the hand, the SNM leaders were bereft of any kind of political lead from Mogadisho with which to soften the traumatic blows inflicted on the people and the country by Barre’s regime in Mogadisho Moreover, the arbitrary formation of a national government, led by Ali Mahdi, and without reference to the SNM, confirmed the northerners worst fears – a repetition of the horrors of rule from Mogadisho. They would have none of it.The spark that ignited the declaration on Saturday , May 18, of the State of Somaliland’s restoration of its sovereignty ( dating back to those four days from 26-30 June 1960), was an announcement on May 15 over Radio Mogadisho. The announcement said that the
SNM had agreed to attend a meeting with southern political movements in Cairo - the very meeting which the SNM’ssecretary for Foreign Affairs, Suleiman "Gaal", had earlier rejected in talks with Burtros-Ghali. The following morning, outside the Congress Hall in Burao, hand-held loud-speakers drew crowds as the previous night’s announcement was vociferously condemned. By the afternoon, tanks and armored troop carriers took up menacing positions outside the Congress Hall. That evening, the SNM chairman reluctantly passed a message through the military network ( the only communication system then intact) to Ali Mahdi, advising him that Radio Hargeisa would that night is broadcasting a declaration of independence. Abdirahman Tuur hoped that friendly relations could be maintained. The next day, a Friday and therefore a holiday, no further action was taken. On the Saturday, an enormous crowd assembled to listen to the formal declaration by the SNM chairman and to cheer, more with relief than with euphoria, as the SNM flag was unfurled. The pressure of public opinion had stripped the SNM leadership of caution.For a week therefore a great deal of lobbying was in progress over a draft constitution. The Executive Committee of the
SNM as a whole had a preference for an executive president. Abdirahman Tuur, to begin with, backed the idea of a prime minister nominated by the president. Silaanyo was also in favor of a constitutional president and a prime minister. But he did not put forward his name for office. One day before the issue was due to be discussed in Burao by SNM Central Committee, Tuur changed his position and came out in favor of an executive president. Tuur was in the advantageous position of being the movement’s incumbent chairman. Thus, the point at issue before the Central Committee was whether the Somaliland Republic (The new name adopted instead of the State of Somaliland, as it had been formally know on independence in 1960) would be best governed by an executive president as head of state. Tuur put the principle of an executive-president to a vote on May 26. The majority, 46 votes to 33, was in favor of an executive-president. Tuur then had the difficult task of forming a government which combined clan proportional representation with political and administrative ability.The problem for those who favored the premier system, and this included Silanyo and his not inconsiderable followers among
SNMveteran and allies among the Dhulbahante and Warsangli, was that voting eligibility of the SNM Central committee was disproportionately Isaaq and did not sufficiently take account of the potential vote among non-Isaaq. This bone of contention was to dog Tuur’s government therefore despite ministerial reshuffles to ameliorate the friction. The Persistence of this unsolved – perhaps unsolvable – problem of proportional representation led to some 16 months of serious intra-clan disputes which rendered the country insecure and ungovernable.Although the
SNM government remained firm during this period on the question of seeking foreign recognition for its self-proclaimed independence, the specter of an emasculated government, unable to control its militia and thus unable to secure its main revenue base in the port of Berbera, caused some fraying of non-Isaaq clan allegiance towards independence and a desire to reunite with Somalia. There political parties with indeterminate support claimed to be part and parcel of Somalia, attending internal and international conference under their respective party labels: The United Somali Party (USP) of Darood: Dhulbahanet and Warsangali sub-clan Front of the Issa sub-clan in the West. Support for reunion with Somalia would fluctuate with the variables of Tuur’s and Aideed’s respective political fortunes.Tuur’s fortunes received a fatal blow when dissension within the ranks of the
SNM Central Committee rendered it impossible to convene two consecutive committee meetings in 1992. The second failure was at the end of November which meant in effect that a new government could not be formed. Ignoring this provision in theSNM constitution, Tuur formed a new government on December 3. This was not well-received by the Council of Elders who had earlier arranged for a pan-Somaliland conference in Borama, scheduled for 9 January 1993, to discuss, inter security and the new institutions of government which would succeed the 2 year provisional period of government after May 18, 1993.The Council of Elders, who numbered 150 persons and who was led by Sheikh Ibrahim Sheikh Yusuf Sheikh Madar, invited further proportional representation from every clan in Somaliland to the Borama conference. The composite conference, described as "The Somaliland Inter-Clan Council Conference", was a cross-section of elders, religious leaders, politicians, former civil servants, intellectuals, businessmen and others – some 500 people . Unlike the UN-sponsored Addis-Ababa conference in March, which cost US$1.3 million, the Borama conference, lasting four months, coast the UN virtually nothing, though some logistical help in the way of air transport was provided. By April 25, two major resolutions were adopted: on a countrywide security framework and on a national constitutional structure.
The security framework looked at the issues from two angles: the immediate steps to be taken and longer term measures. The immediate steps included the removal to camps of clan militia from all cities, towns and urban centers, and from all major roads. All check-points were also to be removed. The implementation was to be carried out jointly be militia commanders and members of the Inter-Clan Council. The longer term measures included the registration of arms, the size of a national army, and the criteria for selection, retraining and employment opportunities. An appeal was made to the international community for financial assistance.
Several options were presented for debate covering the country’s future constitutional structure. The chosen formula was an Executive President as head of state and Chairman of a council of ministers, together with a Vice-President. There would be a Council of Ministers and a legislature. During the remaining days of the Conference, decisions which were held over concerned the adoption of a national charter, the establishment of the legislature.
Earlier, to everyone’s surprise, Ali Mahd’s prime Minister, Omar Arteh, announced that he was returning to the fold and that he would be attending the Borama Conference. On arrival at Hargeisa airport he was greeted by his own sub-clan and on reaching Borama, Arteh made generous contributions to the Conference which helped the elders to prolong their deliberations. Arteh become one of three contenders for the Presidency. The other two were Abdirahman Tuur and Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal. The latter had been Somaliland’s first Prime Minister on independence in 1960 and subsequently Prime Minister of the Somali Republic from 1967-69.
The election for President and Vice-President was preceded by lobbying and formal address to elders by the three candidates. The election itself, at 10 a.m. on May 16, was marred when 29 of the 150 eligible voters walked out of the Hall before voting, on the grounds that the Chairman, Sheikh Yusuf, had denied Tuur and Arteh last minute statements to the assembled elders. Both of them had, in fact made statements on previous days. When the vote was taken Egal received 99 of the 150 possible votes. On Egal’s election as President both A.Tuur and Arteh agreed to support him . A Vice-President was also elected: Mujahid Abdirahman Aw Ali. From Borama. He was a Colonel commanding SNM in the struggle against Said Barre; one of the very few from Borama who then supported the SNM. With the exodus of Barre’s troops from Borama, Aw Ali become governor and was attributed with having been responsible in the main for reviving the administration of the region, collecting taxes and invigorating a new police force, judiciary and prison service.
The legislature was to bicameral, a lower and upper house with 75 members each. The qualifications for the lower house, which would legislate, would be to have at least secondary education. The upper house would participate in all legislation, with security being their prime function. The upper house would reconcile political differences and summon a National Congress if differences should persist.
Egal and Aw Ali were given a rapturous reception when they arrived in Hargeisa on May 27, as witnessed by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Admiral Jonathan Howe, who fortuitously paid his first official visit to Hargeisa on that day. Egal told Howe it did not matter to him what he or his country were called by the UN; he did not expect immediate recognition from the UN as a Republic, but he did urgently want rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance from the United Nations, including food-aid for the newly recruited police force ( recruited during Tuur’s tenure, with the help of the Council of Elders). By September, some 6,000 militia had been disarmed and were encamped at Mandera for retraining. The UN agencies based in Hargeisa, principally UNICEF and UNDP, together with Save the Children Found, rose to the occasion and did what they could to support the ex-militia in Mandera, but a combination of UNOSOM, which had no funds, USAID and the World Food Program ( which had done sterling work elsewhere in Somalia), failed to get their act together and Egal had to borrow huge sums of money from merchants to buy food for the 6,000.
This was not Egal’s only disappointment with UNOSOM. In late August he received a leaded copy of a confidential memorandum, date August 16, written by the American Zone Director in Bosaso and addressed to the Deputy Special Representative in Mogadishu. In it the Zone Director urged UNOSOM, inter Alai , to hasten the disintegration of Somaliland by excising the Sanag region from direct contact with the UNOSOM Zone Director in Hargeisa and supporting rebel minorities in the eastern border areas contiguous with the North-East region of Bari. To compound the indiscretion, the Deputy Special Representative, after Eagal received the leaked copy of the letter, visited both Erigavo and Las-Anod, accompanied by the American Zone Director in Bosaso, without seeking the opinion of Eagal whom he had visited in Hargeisa a few days earlier on August 25. Little wonder Eagal was under considerable pressure from his colleagues to ask UNOSOM to leave their country. Egal did precisely that, in as gentle a manner as possible, for he had been greatly helped by the UNOSOM director, Keith Beaver. UNOSOM stopped work but declined to leave. There was no security problem – just a stalemate.
Egal’s government sough de facto recognition, falling far short of recognizing a sovereign state, yet the international community balked at it on the grounds that it was a matter for a Somali national central government to decide. The fact of the situation in Somaliland is that they have elected a government in the most democratic way possible, within the constraints of available finance; they have demobilized and disarmed; they have restructured customs services in the port of Berbera and introduced an audit system. None of this effort could be attributed to single United Nations initiative. One might reasonably ask: Would such stability have been possible in Washington dc, if the head of police there had lost the power of paying his police force and of imposing deterrents to criminal behavior?
The majority of Somaliland’s population has waited years and years for the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to participate in their macro development needs; they have thus been penalized by the failure of Southern Somalia to form a central administration without which the World Bank and IMF cannot see their way to participate. Faced with this intractable problem, the political leadership has no option but to redouble efforts in the search for international sponsorship. For both Somalia and Somaliland, separation is viable in that there is no interdependence between them, but an enforced union against the will of the majority would become a serious liability, possibly leading to war.
"INDEPENDENCE OF SEPARATE STATEHOOD IS NOT SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS. OUR UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF THE SEVEREIGN STATE OF SOMALILAND IS IRREVERSIBLE."
Aniis Abdillahi Essa
Somaliland Advocacy Group
Washington DC.
Aniis@Yahoo.com
